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az body axis vertical acceleration, m/sec2 (ft/sec2) or. g units as noted







Cm pitching-moment coefficient, qbc
D aerodynamic drag, N (Ib)
g acceleration due to gravity, 9.8 m/sec2 (32.17 ft/sec2)
h airplane height above takeoff surface, m (ft)
hfC airplane tail clearance height, m (ft)
lyy pitching moment-of-inertia, kg-m2 (slug-ft2)
K1D/W induced drag to weight ratio (dimensionless)
L aerodynamic lift, n (Ib)
L CL
— lift to drag ratio, -^—
u LD
m mass, kg (slugs)
pF2
q dynamic pressure, , kg/m2 (lb/ft2)
S reference wing area, m2 (ft2)
5 distance from brake release, m (ft)
sm static margin
s3s measured takeoff distance to clear a 10.7-m (35-ft) obstacle from brake release, m (ft)
T thrust, N(lb)
tr rotation time (to lift-off), sec
~T. thrust to weight ratio ;
V equivalent airspeed, m/sec (ft/sec) or knots as noted
V'^ p speed at engine failure, knots ,
VLQP speed at main gear lift-off, knots
^maxa minimum demonstrated straight-flight speed without exceeding the absolute angle-
of-attack limitation, knots
^MC minimum control speed, knots
minimum control speed in free air, knots
minimum demonstrated flight speed, knots
^MU minimum unstick speed, knots • :
Vn speed at time of rotation control input, knots . .
Fy stall speed, knots : .. • ,
VZRC zero rate of climb speed, knots . . : . . . . . . .
FI takeoff decision speed, knots
K2 takeoff safety speed (one-engine-inoperative initial climb speed), knots
F3 all-engines-operating initial climb speed, knots
F35 speed attained at 10.7-m (35-ft) height, knots
W weight, kg (Ib)
W
-Tr airplane wing loading, kg/m2 (lb/ft2) : .
a angle of attack, radians or degrees as noted
(3 sideslip angle (relative wind from right, positive), deg
























elevator deflection angle (trailing-edge down, positive), deg
flap deflection angle, deg
airplane pitch attitude relative to horizontal (ANU, positive), deg
airplane pitch attitude at lift-off, deg
standard air density, kg/m3 (slug/ft3)
bank angle (right wing .down, positive), deg
incremental change
derivative with respect to time, -r-
achieved
all engines operating
airplane nose up, airplane nose down
center of gravity
Federal Aviation Regulations
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The objective of this joint NASA/FAA study was to provide data for use in development
of takeoff airworthiness standards for new aircraft designs such as the supersonic transport (SST)
and the large wide-body subsonic jet transport. For this purpose, an advanced motion simulator
was used to compare the performance and handling characteristics of three representative large
jet transports during specific flight certification tasks. Existing regulatory constraints and methods
for determining rotation speed were reviewed, and the effects on takeoff performance of variations
in rotation speed, pitch attitude, and pitch attitude rate during the rotation maneuver were ana-
lyzed. A limited quantity of refused takeoff information was obtained. The aerodynamics, wing
loading, and thrust-to-weight ratio of the subject SST resulted in takeoff speeds limited by climb
(rather than lift-off) considerations. Takeoff speeds based on U.S. subsonic transport requirements
were found unacceptable because of the criticality of rotation-abuse effects on one-engine-
inoperative climb performance. Adequate safety margin was provided by takeoff speeds based on
proposed Anglo-French supersonic transport (TSS) criteria, with the limiting criterion being
that takeoff safety speed (V2) be at least 1.15 times the one-engine-inoperative zero-rate-of-
climb speed. Various observations related to SST certification are presented.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of new aircraft designs, whose performance and handling characteristics
differ in important respects from those of earlier designs, the validity of existing airworthiness
criteria for advanced aircraft has come into question. A series of cooperative NASA/FAA studies
was initiated at Ames Research Center in which advanced piloted simulators were used to provide
data as a basis for the development of takeoff certification criteria for new aircraft designs, such
as the SST and the large wide-body subsonic jet transports. This study, the first research program
conducted on the Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft, was made in late 1969.
Results of earlier Ames simulator studies with certification-related objectives are contained
in references 1 and 2. Reference 1 reports on the validation of a fixed-cockpit simulator for
takeoff certification investigations and points out the requirement for lateral motion of the
cockpit for tests involving asymmetric thrust where recognition of engine failure is important.
The program reported in reference 2 used the same fixed-cockpit simulator to study the takeoff
performance and handling qualities of a delta-wing SST designed to take off and land at speeds
comparable to those of existing subsonic jet transports. In the present study, an SST configuration
closer in size and wing loading to Anglo-French and Russian SST configurations was used, and
the tests were conducted on an advanced piloted simulator with a large lateral motion capability.
EQUIPMENT
The study was conducted using the Ames Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft (FSAA)
(fig. 1). The simulator had five-degrees-of-freedom motion with a nominal lateral capability of
±g/2 (±16 ft/sec2) acceleration and ± 17 m (±50 ft) of displacement (refs. 3 and 4). This capability
provided realistic motion cues for such tasks as control following engine failure and lateral
maneuvering. Simulator performance characteristics are given in table 1. The simulator was
designed for six-degrees-of-freedom motion, but the pitch rotational motion was not yet operable
at the time of this study. As discussed in appendix A, which describes the motion drive computa-
tions and system effectiveness, this was not considered a limiting factor.
The FSAA cab was equipped with a conventional flight test instrument display (fig. 2), as
well as instruments for indicating normal and longitudinal acceleration, angle of attack, angle of
sideslip, tail clearance, and control surface deflections. Figure 3 shows photographs of the FD-109
attitude display and the airspeed indicator. No flight director commands were provided to the
pilot. The control-column, control-wheel, and rudder-pedal force characteristics were provided
by hydraulic control loaders.
Closed-circuit color television provided the external visual scene, which was viewed through
a collimating lens substituted for the windshield. This visual system provided a 3,300-m (10,700-ft)
runway for the takeoff task (refs. 3 and 4).
The data generated during the simulator tests were recorded in time-history form, and included
control deflections, thrust, airspeed, airplane attitudes, airplane position, translational accelerations,
angular rates, angles of attack and sideslip, and simulator cab accelerations and positions. A digital
printout (fig. 4) of significant discrete performance parameters followed each simulated takeoff,
and pilot comments were recorded.
SIMULATED TEST AIRPLANES
The three airplane types simulated were: (1) reference jet transport (RJT), approximating the
707, DC-8, and 990 classes of jet transports with a maximum takeoff weight of 136,000 kg
(300,000 Ib); (2) jumbo jet transport (JJT), modeled as an RJT scaled up in size to provide the
same wing loading for a maximum takeoff weight of 317,000 kg (700,000 Ib); and (3) supersonic
transport (SST), a tailless double-delta-wing airplane with no high-lift devices, with a maximum
gross weight of 168,000 kg (370,000 Ib) and with aerodynamic characteristics determined from
wind tunnel tests (ref. 5).
The significant physical parameters for each of the three airplanes are given in table 2.
Figure 5 shows two-view diagrams of the airplanes. Airplane geometry was such that tail contact
with the runway (with oleos fully extended) would occur at a pitch attitude of 13.8° with the
RJT and JJT and at 13.1° with the SST. Basic lift, drag, and pitching-moment characteristics
for free-air and in-ground-effect conditions are presented in figure 6. SST elevator effectiveness
was increased progressively to a maximum increment of 20 percent when in full ground effect.
An error was made in programming the ground-effect height factor for the JJT, which
caused the differences shown in figure 6 between RJT and JJT aerodynamics near the ground.
This error was discovered after testing was completed, but the effects were well understood, so
repeat testing was not warranted. As shown in figure 7, the error resulted in excessive ground
effect at wheel heights between 0 and 7.6 m (25 ft), the maximum error occurring at zero wheel
height. Above 7.6 m the error is considered negligible for takeoff operations. In terms of total
aerodynamic lift, drag, and pitching moment, the consequences of the error for the JJT were that:
(1) drag was 6.1 percent low during the ground roll; (2) lift was 7.6 percent high at lift-off
(equivalent to 1.2° Aa); (3) about 25 percent (2°) more elevator was required during rotation;
and (4) L/D at lift-off was about 23 percent high (lift-off climb performance was 13.3 percent
high with all engines operating and 23 percent high with one engine inoperative at standard-day
thrust). The significance of these effects will be indicated at appropriate points in the discussion.
The effect on normal takeoffs was primarily to cause lift-off at a slightly lower attitude than
intended, and the effect on general handling characteristics during takeoff was minimal.
Irreversible control systems were assumed for all three airplanes; control characteristics are
given in table 3. Control force displacement characteristics remained unchanged with variations
in dynamic pressure and normal acceleration. Simple pitch and roll damping augmentation was
normally "on" for the SST takeoffs.
Figure 8 shows the available thrust variation with speed assumed for these tests. The thrust-
to-weight ratio as a function of speed was essentially the same for the RJT and JJT. The limit
value of (T - D)/W resulted from adjusting thrust so that climb performance in the second segment
configuration equaled 3 percent gradient, as required by reference 6. Engine spindown dynamic
response approximated a 1-sec first-order lag for most of the engine-failure tests conducted.
TEST PROCEDURE
Over 500 takeoffs were made and included all-engines-operating normal takeoffs, all-engines-
operating abused takeoffs, one-engine-inoperative takeoffs, one-engine-inoperative abused take-
offs, and refused takeoffs. Two NASA and three FAA research test pilots participated in the study.
Each pilot was given a flight card for each test series, which defined the task, the configuration,
and the corresponding reference speeds (takeoff decision speed K,, rotation speed V^, and takeoff
safety speed V2).
The pilots were briefed to abort the takeoff in the event of engine failure prior to K, ;
for engine failure following K,, the pilot was to acquire V2 by the 10.7-m (35-ft) height and use
it as the climb speed. With all engines operating, the target climb speed was K2 + 10 knots.
During most of the takeoffs, an observer in the copilot seat called out "100 knots," " V l " and
"rotate" as these speeds were reached.
Takeoff reference speeds used for normal operation of the RJT and JJT were based on
.information from the appropriate subsonic jet transport operational flight manual. The same
speeds were used for both the RJT and JJT for corresponding conditions of wing loading, flap
position, and thrust-to-weight ratio. Selection of SST reference speeds was based on requirements
in references 6, 7, and 8, as discussed in appendix B. SST speeds were selected for the maximum
takeoff gross weight and were usually based on the Anglo-French requirement that F2 be greater
than 1.15 times the zero rate of climb speed in the one-engine-inoperative landing-gear-retracted
configuration (TSS standard 2, 6.2.2.2 (b) (i), ref. 7). The reference speeds used are shown in
table 4 and figure 9.
Each piloted session was approximately 1-1/2 hr long and averaged 20 takeoff runs. For
each test condition, the pilot was allowed to make as many runs as he considered necessary to
meet the test objective. The runs were discontinued after the pilot had stabilized on climb speed
and attitude (approximately 20 sec after lift-off). Sea-level standard calm conditions and zero
runway gradient were assumed for all runs except those in which a 25-knot steady crosswind
was added.
PILOT ASSESSMENT OF NORMAL TAKEOFF CHARACTERISTICS
Each pilot made a series of normal takeoffs with each airplane at maximum gross weight.
Flaps were set at 25° for the two subsonic airplanes. The eg position was 0.25 ~c for all three
airplanes, corresponding to a midrange value for the RJT and JJT and the forward limit for the SST.
All participating pilots considered the simulator quite realistic for the reference jet at maximum
takeoff gross weight. Directional control through the pedal-connected nose-wheel steering was
good. A smooth rotation at V^ resulted in lift-off at speeds slightly below F2. The RJT accelerated
through Vi as a positive rate of climb was established and airspeed continued to increase. Normal
takeoffs with the JJT and RJT were remarkably similar, differing mainly in the noticeably slower
response of the JJT in roll and pitch.
Normal takeoffs with the simulated SST were different from those of the subsonic con-
figurations tested. Four-engine performance was outstanding. Takeoff technique was more
critical from a safety and performance standpoint. Variations from the best rotation rate, angle,
and speeds caused larger deviations in takeoff distance, and could cause tail strikes. There seemed
to be little problem with tail strikes when the rotation and lift-off were performed in a smooth
and continuous manner, and at a rate which allowed the airplane to accelerate through V2
before reaching the final climb attitude. On the other hand, there was sufficient control power
to cause an unwanted tail strike, the result if the rotation rates were comparable to those cur-
rently used on the small trijets, for example. Pilots used the real-world cues for reference more than
the attitude indicator in performing rotation. The pitch attitude during rotation could be
judged by an occasional glance at the airspeed indicator just as is done with a conventional
heavy jet transport, but with the SST it was more important to ensure that the airspeed continued
to increase as the aircraft was rotated. There was definitely no advantage in a fast rotation to
a preset attitude with this airplane. After lift-off with all engines operating, climb attitudes and
airspeed were easily established even without stability augmentation.
PILOT ASSESSMENT OF ONE-ENGINE-INOPERATIVE TAKEOFF
CHARACTERISTICS IN A CROSSWIND
At the end of each series of normal takeoffs a 25-knot crosswind was introduced, and a
series of takeoffs was made with an engine failure usually occurring at or after Vt. At unannounced
times throughout the program, engine failure occurred prior to Vl, resulting in a refused takeoff
(RTO) (see appendix C). Five comparative time histories of the one-engine-inoperative crosswind
takeoffs are given in figure 10.
All participating pilots considered the simulator quite effective for coping with an engine
failure during takeoff, largely because of the high fidelity of reproduction of the cockpit lateral
accelerations. The crosswind condition combined with an engine failure produced a most demand-
ing task with the RJT. The transition from ground directional control (which requires rudder and
spoiler to balance the sideslip) to airborne directional control was very critical. The rudder
required for ground directional control had little to do with the pedal force required to maintain
zero sideslip flight as lift-off occurred. During the ground run, the rudder deflection required is
defined by the thrust asymmetry, rudder effectiveness, nose-wheel steering effectiveness, direction
and magnitude of the crosswind component, and the airplane static directional stability. Once
the craft is airborne, only the first two factors define the rudder deflection required. Figure lUv. ' -)
shows that, with an engine failure on the downwind side, a reversal of rudder deflection was
required during lift-off.
For the JJT, yaw following the failure was less abrupt than for the RJT and consequently
easily controlled (fig. 10(a)). The roll control power was low for the transition from ground
directional control to balanced flight, but the roll-yaw mode was not as easily excited and a
smoother second segment climb was established.
The engine-out takeoff with the simulated SST contrasted sharply with the all-engines-
operating case. The engine-out performance degradation was severe and produced a very critical
piloting task to get the airplane airborne in a condition where it would continue to gain energy.
Piloting technique and the avoidance of early rotation was of utmost importance. Airspeed had
to je closely monitored because it was easy to become airborne in ground effect, without the
ability to accelerate or climb, unless rigid attention was paid to Vn and the airplane was flown
off the ground so that speed continued to increase as altitude was gained. If speeds were not
abused, the engine failure was not as hard to manage for the SST as it was for the RJT. Directional
control at lift-off was improved over the RJT, and during the transition, the yaw motion to
reduce sideslip did not require damping by the pilot. Thus, as the ground control rudder forces
were eased during rotation, balanced flight was attained quickly. Sideslip due to a failed
engine was easy to sort out and lateral controllability was very good. Again, it was important
to adjust the rudder forces quickly to allow neutral lateral control in the engine-failed case,
especially since performance was marginal and cross control was not beneficial.
EFFECTS OF PILOT TECHNIQUE ON NORMAL TAKEOFF DATA
To make a quantitative comparison of the normal takeoff characteristics of the three
airplanes it is necessary to separate out variations that occur because of differences in pilot
technique. This was done by examining "average" takeoff time histories of airspeed, pitch
attitude, and altitude for individual pilots for each airplane. The next
 > step was to examine
histograms that show variability in the takeoff time histories for several pilots.
Average Normal Takeoffs
Near the end of the study, each of the two NASA pilots was asked to make approximately
10 calm-air maximum-gross-weight takeoffs with each airplane as he normally would with that
particular airplane in commercial operation. The records from these runs were then used to
generate the "average" time histories (fig. 11) by reading values at 1-sec intervals over a 25-sec
time span starting 5 sec before Vn, computing the average at each time, and plotting the averages.
The extreme high and low values at each time define the shaded regions in figure 11. Because of
significant differences in pilot technique, separate time histories are shown for each pilot.
The takeoffs made by pilot A were representative of operational takeoffs, while those of
pilot B were more typical of those conducted in certification testing where minimizing takeoff
distance to the 10.7-m height is a primary consideration. Pilot A tended to use lower rotation
rates than pilot B, rotating smoothly to the climb attitude over a 10 to 15-sec time span. This
allowed simultaneous acquisition of the desired climb speed (F2 + 10) and .attitude with the two
subsonic airplanes. With the SST, pilot A used a climb attitude about 3° less than that required for
a constant speed climb, and obtained a 1 knot/sec accelerating climb. This technique allowed
the L/D to increase as speed increased and resulted in a more efficient climb, while still providing
a substantial initial climb gradient.
Pilot B used a more rapid rotation, attaining the climb attitude in less than 5 sec with the
RJT and JJT. Although this technique satisfied the F2 requirement at the 10.7-m height, it
resulted in acquisition of climb attitude at a speed less than F2 + 10, and a need to accelerate
during the initial climb. As a result, the climb attitude was lower than that used by pilot A.
Pilot B used 6 to 10 sec to rotate to the climb attitude with the SST, because of the large attitude
change required and concern over the possibility of tail strike. He viewed the F2 + 10 target
climb speed as a more rigid requirement than did pilot A, and therefore used a constant-speed
climb with the SST.
Histograms
To obtain the largest histogram sample sizes possible, data from normal takeoffs made
throughout the study were included with those from the runs conducted to form the average
normal takeoff time histories described above. Mean values are indicated in the histograms by
vertical dashed lines.
The variability in rotation speed that occurred during attempts to rotate at target values is
shown in figure 12. With all engines operating and at maximum gross weight, all rotations were
within a band ranging from 8 knots below to 6 knots above the target speed. The variability of
rotation speed for the one-engine-inoperative case was slightly less than that for the all-engines-
operating case. The scatter in SST rotation speed was greater than for the subsonic transports,
primarily because of the higher acceleration.
A small sample of RJT and JJT takeoff runs at light weight (high T/W) indicate a tendency to
exceed the target rotation speed in that condition.
The rotation time was defined as the interval from the time the control column was moved
beyond 2.5 cm (1 in.) aft to the time the main landing gear lifted off the runway. The rotation
time is shown in figure 13. The RJT and JJT mean rotation times were 3.5 and 3.7 sec, respectively,
while that for the SST was 4.5 sec. The effect of rotation time on minimum tail clearance is shown
in figure 14. Rotation times for/the JJT would have been 0.5 to 1 sec longer and tail clearance
about 0.61 m (2 ft) less if the in-ground-effect aerodynamics had been identical with those of
the RJT.
The rotation data were reviewed to determine whether some common maximum value of
pitch rate, pitch acceleration, or pilot-station normal acceleration governed rotation for all
three airplanes but none was found. It is not yet possible to state whether the results would
have been different had pitch motion cues been present, although as discussed in appendix A,
pilots subjectively considered the combined vertical acceleration motion cues and visual cues
adequate for the rotation task. Evidence indicates that the vertical acceleration motion cues
were helpful during rotation; for example, following a series of RJT takeoffs in which fairly
consistent peak rotation rates were used, the motion system was made inoperative and a fixed-
base takeoff was made. The peak pitch rate used in the fixed-base run was 2.5 times greater
than in the motion runs, yet the pilot considered the run a "carbon copy" of the preceding run
with motion.
Pitch attitude at lift-off and maximum pitch attitude to the 10.7-m height are shown
in figure 15 for each airplane. The mean lift-off attitude of the JJT was about 1° less than
that of the RJT, showing the effect of the difference in programmed ground-effect lift. Figure 16
shows the variability of VLQP and K35 for the three airplanes; and figure 17 shows the speed
gained between rotation initiation and lift-off and between lift-off and the 10.7-m height.
The effect of the SST's high T/W is evident in the large speed gain realized during the rotation
prior to lift-off, 16 to 34 knots for the SST with all engines operating compared with 6 to
13 knots for the RJT. During the airborne segment to the 10.7-m height, however, the SST
speed gain was no greater than that for the RJT, a result of the greater "flare-up" vertical accel-
eration used with the SST (shorter air time) and the associated higher induced drag. With one
engine inoperative, the speed gain in the airborne segment was less for the SST than for the
RJT and was negative in four of seven runs, indicating a decelerating condition after lift-off.
Figure 18 presents measured distances to lift-off Sj^Qp and to the 10.7-m altitude s3S.
(Throughout this report, measured takeoff distance s3s is defined as distance from brake release
to the achieving of 10.7-m wheel height.) Two small compensating factors - the greater ground
effect and the use of lower rotation rates — resulted in JJT distances about equal to those of
the RJT. In figure 19, measured takeoff distance s3s is plotted versus the time to rotate for the
all-engines-operating and one-engine-inoperative cases. The definite correlation indicates that
'the greater variation of takeoff distance shown for the SST in figure 18 may be due primarily
to the variation in rotation time at the higher takeoff speeds of the SST. The speeds at the
10.7-m height corresponding to the extreme rotation times for each condition are also shown
in figure 19. Although this figure shows that SST takeoff distance increases rapidly with increased
rotation time, it should not be interpreted as suggesting the use of high rate rotations with this
aircraft — other factors must be considered. As discussed in the next section, high rotation
rates seriously increased measured takeoff distance when one engine was inoperative and accel-
eration to F2 was accomplished in the airborne segment prior to reaching the 10.7-m height.
The maximum incremental vertical acceleration (AaZrnax) during the flare-up maneuver
and the height at which AaZmax occurred are shown in the histograms of figure 20. The mean
of AaZmax (for both NASA pilots) was 0.15 g for the RJT, 0.11 g for the JJT, and 0.31 g for
the SST. The differences in pilot technique are evident in these SST data. For pilot A only, the
mean AaZmax during SST takeoffs was 0.225 g. The high accelerations occurring during the
SST takeoffs performed by pilot B appear to be the result of his rigid adherence to the use of
Vi + 10 as a climb speed. The data of pilot B at Aaz above 0.3 are questionable because the
vertical motion cues of the simulator were truncated for low-frequency accelerations exceeding
0.25 g, as indicated in appendix A.
An interesting observation was made regarding the height at which AaZmax occurred. During
most of the SST runs, AaZmax was seen to occur as the pitch rate was arrested to establish the
climb attitude, which was at a mean height of 18.5 m (61 ft) (fig. 20), whereas AaZmax for the
subsonic airplanes often occurred during the initial portion of the flareup. Figure 21 is a time
history of vertical acceleration at the center of gravity and pilot's station for one of the SST
takeoffs performed by pilot B. The peak accelerations sensed by the pilot (in the calm air environ-
ment of these tests) were less than those experienced at the center of gravity because of eleven
lift effect and the pilot location about 27 m (90 ft) forward of the center of gravity.
TAKEOFF ABUSE TESTS
During the certification testing of a new airplane and after the normal takeoff speeds and
procedures are established, tests are conducted to prove that handling qualities and distances
are satisfactory when the normal speeds and procedures are abused. Airworthiness requirements
applicable to subsonic jet transports require that expected service variations, such as overrotation
or out-of-trim conditions, will not result in unsafe flight characteristics or in marked (defined as
1 percent) increases in scheduled takeoff distances. One such demonstration specifically required
is that the one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance with a rotation speed 5 knots less than the
established Vn does not exceed the corresponding one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance
with the normal V^.
Concern about possible SST takeoff characteristics led to the generation of numerous
proposals for additional takeoff abuse demonstrations for SST aircraft. In this study, existing
and proposed abuse tests were assessed at maximum takeoff gross weight conditions in an effort
to identify appropriate tests and eliminate unnecessary ones. The effects of the abuses were
compared with the normal takeoff, and as a further basis for comparison, similar abuse tests
were conducted with the RJT at climb-limited thrust (limit (T-D)/W, see fig. 8). For the one-
engine-inoperative tests, an outboard engine was made to fail at approximately Vl (175 knots
for the SST and 138 knots for the RJT).
The two parameters of primary importance during takeoff are distance from brake release
to the 10.7-m height and the corresponding speed at that point. The intent is, of course, to
become airborne at the lowest practical speed to minimize the tire speed requirements, reach
10.7-m height in the least distance to minimize runway length requirements, and yet have
acquired sufficient speed at the 10.7-m height to provide satisfactory climb performance with
an engine failed. The latter consideration is of increased importance for SST aircraft; as indicated
in figure 9, the climb capability of these airplanes is considerably more sensitive to speed variations
than that of current sweptwing transports.
Some insight is gained into the effects of different types of takeoff abuses by recognizing
the relationship of speed versus distance during takeoff. During the takeoff ground run, this
relationship approximates a parabola of the form s = V212a with acceleration nearly constant
and with a slope dV/ds - a/V (fig. 22). Acceleration varies slightly with speed as a result of
aerodynamic drag, rolling resistance, and thrust variations. Factors that can affect acceleration
significantly during takeoff, and thus the slope dV/ds, include engine failure, drag increases due
to rotation, decrease in L/D as ground effect decreases, and the flight path angle during the
airborne portion to the 10.7-m height. The variations in pilot technique (abuse effects) cause
variations from the nominal, or normal takeoff, curves defined — a measure of the efficiency
of the takeoff.
The data points on figure 22 show speed and distance at the 10.7-m height for a number of
takeoffs using normal technique. These values can be used as the basis for evaluating the abuse effects.
Figure 23 shows the data of figure 22, as well as the results from various takeoff abuses.
Data points that fall below those representing normal takeoffs indicate less efficient takeoffs
in which (1) less speed was acquired for a given distance, and thus the resulting climb away
capability was degraded; or (2) excessive distance was used. Variations in pilot technique caused
greater variations in performance for the SST than for the RJT, as evidenced by the greater
scatter in the SST data, especially for the one-engine-inoperative case. As described in appendix B,
the criticality of the effects of takeoff abuses when one engine was inoperative made it clear that
reference speeds (V^ and V2) based on requirements applicable to current subsonic transports,
FAR 25 (ref. 6), would not provide sufficient margin for the SST. The SST abuse tests described
in this section used reference speeds based on the proposed TSS requirements (ref. 7), while
FAR 25 requirements yielded reference speeds about 15 knots less.
Supersonic Transport — All Engines Operating
Normal rotation technique.- Measured takeoff distance with all engines operating and using
normal technique (Qin fig. 23) was nominally 2640 m (8670 ft), as shown in figures 18 and 23.
The all-engines-operating s35 was 2270 m (7450 ft) when speed at the 10.7-m (35-ft) height
equaled F2 (225 knots, table 4). In fact, a maximum-practical rotation rate was required to
achieve K2 and the 10.7-m height simultaneously. (For the SST, a maximum practical rotation
rate was defined by ground clearance considerations, as indicated in fig. 14.)
Three-seconds late rotation.- The most critical abuse test with all engines operating was the
3-sec late rotation (Din fig. 23), which yielded measured distances ranging from 2540 m (8320 ft)
with V3S = V2 + 15 to 2960 m (9700 ft) with V3S = V^ + 32. The rotation speed produced by
a 3-sec delay was about 20 knots greater than the normal Vg (table 4), resulting in a target
rotation speed of 229 knots. The shortest distances represent rotations at the maximum practical
rate, while the longer distance represents a normal rotation rate. The opinion of one pilot was
that these higher rotation speeds were desirable (in the absence of tire limit considerations) to
permit prompt flareup to climb attitude with little chance of striking the tail.
Two-degrees underrotation.— The 2° underrotation tests ( \} in fig. 23) resulted in measured
takeoff distances ranging from 2610 to 2870 m (8570-9430 ft). The major problem in under-
rotation testing appeared to be one of clearly defining the proper target attitude. Should rotation
be arrested at 2° below lift-off attitude, or below climbout attitude? It appears that this test is
significant only if the normal rotation technique with the airplane being evaluated uses a two-step
rotation, whereby the lift-off may be delayed by the underrotation. In these tests, the pilots
rotated to a 10° to 11° pitch attitude, maintained it for about 2 sec, then continued the rotation.
The underrotated attitude was sufficient to provide lift-off and simply resulted in a shallow initial
flight path until rotation continued. The penalty associated with underrotation depends primarily
on the time considered sufficient for recognition and the resumption of rotation. Current proposed
values of 1 to 2 sec (or the equivalent speed increment) did not appear critical.
Severe overrotation. — A severe overrotation test (not included in fig. 23) was conducted in which
the airplane was rotated more rapidly than practical, with a tail strike occurring at lift-off, and
pitch attitude reaching 22° at 10.7-m (35-ft) height. At the 10.7-m (35-ft) height, the speed
was 221 knots and decreasing, and distance was 2380 m (7500 ft). The minimum speed reached
was 209 knots, but recovery was not difficult with the all-engines-operating T/W. The effect
of overrotation on takeoff distance was, of course, to decrease it. Exceptions could result from
such effects as thrust degradations due to the abnormal angle of attack (an effect not included
in the simulation) or from a pitch attitude rebound following a tail strike due to either pilot
reaction or structural effects. With the speed margins provided by the reference speeds, the all-
engines-operating overrotation demonstration appeared to be unnecessary.
Early rotation.— The various early rotation abuse tests, including those accomplished during the
development of the takeoff reference speeds, resulted in reduced takeoff distance, but at the
expense of reduced (but noncritical) climb performance.
In general, abuse considerations did not appear very significant for the subject SST with all
engines operating. Takeoff speeds selected to ensure adequate safety in the event of engine failure
made the airplane quite forgiving of early, rapid, and overrotation abuses with all engines operating.
In the high T/W condition, the primary concern appeared to be that of exceeding critical tire
limit speeds due to slowed-, late-, or underrotation abuses.
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Supersonic Transport — One Engine Inoperative
Normal rotation technique.— The nominal one-engine-inoperative measured takeoff distance
using normal rotation technique (• symbols in fig. 23) was 2.900 m (9580 ft) with F,, F^, and V2
equal to 175 knots, 209 knots, and 225 knots, respectively. As indicated previously, with one
engine inoperative, the airplane's performance was sensitive to rotation and climb speed abuses.
To illustrate this sensitivity, a number of time histories have been included throughout this
section. Figure 24 is a time history of a one-engine-inoperative takeoff. No rotation abuse task
was specified for this run. Measured takeoff distance was less than the nominal OEI value and
F3S was 2 knots less than F2 and decreasing due to a slight overrotation. Acceleration was
severely reduced in the rotated attitude with one engine inoperative, and therefore to obtain
V-i speed it also was necessary to avoid rapid and early rotations. Very little speed gain occurred
during the flareup; thus, the F2 speed had to be nearly acquired by lift-off.
Nearly all the abuse tests, except early rotation tests where the target V^ was less than
200 knots and the airplane was decelerating at the 10.7-m height resulted in measured takeoff
distances about equal to the normal one-engine-inoperative distance. On these runs, climb
capability beyond the 10.7-m height was a more critical factor than distance. In many instances,
pilots found it difficult to climb or accelerate after leaving ground effect until gear retraction
occurred (12 sec after activation).
Five-knot early rotation.— The 5-knot early rotation ( ^ in fig. 23), target VR of 204 knots,
resulted in a measured takeoff distance about equivalent to that corresponding to the normal rotation
speed, but with V3S ranging from 215 to 223 knots. Figure 25 is a time history of this takeoff
abuse test. The pilot commented on the need to reduce either pitch rate or target pitch attitude
at lift-off to avoid overrotation. With slight overrotation of the aircraft, the 10.7-m wheel
height could be readily achieved at 10 knots below V2, in which case the climb performance
was marginal.
Ten-knot (5 percent) early rotation.— Five takeoff runs were performed by three pilots for the
10-knot (5 percent) early rotation case (^ in fig. 23). The difference in results of these runs again
illustrates the sensitivity of SST takeoff performance to variations in technique. Measured takeoff
distance varied from 2660 m (8740 ft) to 3670 m (12,030 ft). Rotation speed varied approximately
2 knots above and 6 knots below the target speed of 199 knots. Rotation time varied from 4.6 to
7.9 sec, and lift-off speed varied from 213 to 222 knots. Despite the rotation variations, decelera-
tion occurred after lift-off for four of the five runs, with F35 1 to 3 knots less than at lift-off
and decreasing. For the run best satisfying the test objective of recovery of one-half the rotation
speed error, K35 was 221 knots and the measured takeoff distance was slightly greater than that
corresponding to the normal rotation speed. The pilots commented that i t .was necessary to
consciously use a reduced pitch rate and pitch attitude when attempting to recover the speed error.
The ground effect was especially apparent in the marginal performance condition provided
by the one-engine-inoperative 10-knot early takeoff task. Figure 26(a) is a time history of the
run yielding the shortest takeoff distance of those discussed in the preceding paragraph. The
airplane decelerated from 213 to 207 knots during the climb to 30 m (100 ft) where the pilot
arrested the climb rate and was unable to climb or accelerate until the landing gear retracted.
Figure 26(b) is the time history of the second attempt by the same pilot using a reduced att i tude.
The airplane lifted off and attained a 75 m/min (250 ft/min) climb rate, which reduced to zero
as the ground effect diminished. The angle-of-attack trace illustrates that if 1 g flight is to be
maintained, the angle of attack must be increased from approximately 11° at lift-off to about
13° during the climb out of ground effect, indicating the criticality of attitude control in this
phase. Nearly 3670 m (12,000 ft) of runway were consumed from brake release to the 10.7-m
height.
Two takeoff runs were accomplished by one pilot early in the program with F^ equal to
200 knots and F2 not specified. Time histories for these two runs are given in figure 27. Times to
rotate were 6.3 and 3.6 sec and lift-off speed was 224 and 211 knots, respectively, for the first
and second runs. There was little or no acceleration in the airborne phase to the 10.7-m height in
either run, but the total measured distance to 10.7 m was actually less for the higher lift-off
speed. The run with the early lift-off appears to be an exception to the general finding that
distance to the 10.7-m height and speed at 10.7 m are closely related; it appears to be the result
of a takeoff (fig. 27(b)) where attitude was not increased beyond that barely required for lift-off
during the subsequent 5 sec, during which little acceleration was possible because of the marginal
performance at the low lift-off speed. These runs demonstrate the sensitivity of the combined
one-engine-inoperative speed abuse situation to rotation technique, and indicate the difficulty
of identifying a single representative takeoff distance to the 10.7-m height.
Maximum practical rate rotation.— Maximum practical rate rotation (^ in fig. 23) resulted in
speed at the 10.7-m height about 5 knots below V?.. Two takeoff runs shown as time histories
in figure 28 emphasize the poor acceleration capability during the airborne segment following
a premature lift-off. Figure 28(a) represents a near optimum recovery following a maximum
practical rate rotation to lift-off, and figure 28(b) shows the second run by the same pilot in
which he used a reduced pitch attitude in an attempt to attain a speed near V2 at the 10.7-m
height. The initial climb was very shallow, and acceleration was low. With runway being used at
110 m/sec (370 ft/sec) it was necessary to continue the flareup. Two knots of the speed gained
were lost in this maneuver and 400 m (1327 ft) more runway were used.
Five-knot early rotation at maximum practical rate.— The combined abused takeoff with rotation
5 knots early and at the maximum practical rate (Bin fig. 23) resulted in measured takeoff
distance about equal to the nominal one-engine-inoperative distance and V3S about 6 knots
below F2, or in a significantly increased S3S for higher F3S. An example of the former is shown
in the time history of figure 29(a) and represents a good recovery from the rotation abuse.
Figure 29(b) represents a run, with the same task, by another pilot, who rotated 2 knots below
the target of 204, experienced a tail strike during lift-off at 212 knots, accelerated to 221 knots
(4 knots below F2) before passing through the 10.7-m height, and used 4760 m (15,630 ft)
of runway.
Analysis of early rotation effects.— The data from the various early rotation abuse takeoffs were
analyzed to determine how the measured distance to the 10.7-m height varies with the rotation
speed abuse for the SST and RJT (fig. 30). The effect of speed at the 10.7-m height, was considered
by grouping the data for conditions in which (1) the entire rotation speed error was eliminated
before reaching the 10.7-m height; (2) one-half the rotation speed error was eliminated before
reaching the 10.7-m height; and (3) the entire rotation speed error was carried through the
10.7-m height. The distances shown represent near-minimum values for each condition (i.e.,
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considerable scatter in the data existed with much longer distances measured for certain runs
than indicated in the figure). This was most often true in the one-engine-inoperative case where
rotation was at the maximum practical rate. Rapid rotation resulted in an early lift-off and
required more acceleration in the airborne segment where the beneficial ground effect was less
than at the ground level and where the airplane was in an increased drag condition.
During the testing and preparation of the data for figure 30 it was obvious that requiring
acceleration to F2 before reaching the 10.7-m height following an early rotation with one
engine inoperative was an unrealistic and severe task. In fact, it was extremely easy to arrive at
the 10.7-m height with a larger speed error than the rotation speed abuse. On the other hand,
with all engines operating and the requirement that F3S equal K2 the task was not severe, although
the effect of early rotation with both airplanes (SST and RJT) was to increase the takeoff distance
as shown.
If half the speed error was eliminated before the 10.7-m height was reached, early rotation
at a nominal rate resulted in a small reduction in distance, as shown by the dashed lines in
figure 30. Almost no reduction resulted for the SST with one engine inoperative, even though
the reference speeds used for the SST provided it with a greater first-segment climb capability
than that of the RJT. This is probably due to the greater rate of degradation of climb capability
with early speed abuses, higher induced drag during the flareup, and perhaps partially to a greater
rate of reduction of ground effect with increasing height. It is also worth pointing out that
although the SST possesses a much greater ground effect lift than the RJT, the increase in
trimmed L/D (which is the important factor in the ability to accelerate) due to ground effect
is not significantly different.
General remarks.— Attitude control has been shown to be very critical during SST initial climb
with one engine inoperative. Following lift-off at 10° to 11°, attitude had to be increased to
about 14°; less than 13° would result in zero rate of climb in partial ground effect and greater
than 15° in a decelerating climbout.
Perhaps for this type of aircraft it would be worthwhile to consider a takeoff procedure
tailored about the one-engine-inoperative takeoff condition so that in the event of engine
failure the consequences would be minimized. For example, all takeoffs would use a common
reference attitude, such as 14°, for the initial climb. With all engines operating, the resulting
accelerating climb would be more efficient because of the improving L/D although the initial
climb rate in the airport vicinity would be reduced.
Additional study appears necessary to define the probability of occurrence of various takeoff
abuses, and of the factors influencing them. Consideration of combined abuses may be needed
because of the severity of the consequences. For example, failure of an engine near Vt and the
accompanying control problem may generate anxiety leading to an early, high-rate rotation to an
excess attitude. Conversely, knowledge of the penalties associated with early lift-off could




This study concentrated on the portion of takeoff up to attainment of the 10.7-m altitude.
The results obtained for the RJT demonstrated that the FSAA realistically simulated the takeoff
tasks. These tests included a most demanding piloting task — takeoff of the RJT with one engine
inoperative in 25-knot crosswind. For the RJT takeoffs, differences in piloting techniques
produced speed abuses as large as those specified in proposed speed abuse tests. The effects of
these speed abuses on measured takeoff distance and the speed at 10.7 m provide a good basis
of comparison for the SST abuse test results.
The characteristics of the JJT were generally similar to those of the RJT; observed differ-
ences resulted primarily from the larger moments of inertia and reference length. (No control
system differences, such as greater friction or hysteresis effects, were programmed.) The increased
reference length and inertias made the yawing motion following engine failure less abrupt and
more easily controlled; they also made early and rapid rotation abuses appear less likely.
Supersonic Transport Characteristics
The primary factors in SST takeoff characteristics differing significantly from those of the
subsonic jet transports were the T/W and the effects of the low-aspect-ratio wing, which include
the low lift-curve slope, the high induced drag, and the large ground-effect lift.
The low lift-curve slope and absence of high-lift devices resulted in higher lift-off attitudes
and takeoff speeds than for subsonic transports of comparable wing loading. These factors in turn
resulted in greater sensitivity of takeoff distance to variations in rotation rate and time leads or lags.
The high induced drag resulted in a large decrease in acceleration in the takeoff rotation, a
greater degradation of climb gradient with decreasing speed, and a greater performance penalty
(acceleration or climb gradient) during such maneuvers as the takeoff flareup.
The large ground-effect lift made it possible to lift off at speeds significantly below that
required to continue climbout with one engine inoperative. The high T/W provided a high accel-
eration and climbout capability with all engines operating, which resulted in large speed increments
between rotation initiation, lift-off, and climbout. The large thrust loss, due to a failed engine
combined with the high induced drag of the airplane when rotated, caused a pronounced loss in
performance and resulted in a large difference between the speed increments for one-engine-
inoperative and all-engines-operating takeoffs. Pilots said that the one-engine-operative per-
formance degradation was severe, producing a very critical piloting task to get the airplane
airborne in a condition where it could continue to gain energy. Because of the severe loss in
acceleration accompanying rotation and the climb gradient sensitivity to climb speed abuse,
proper piloting technique, including the avoidance of rapid and early rotations, was imperative.
These results indicate the advantages to be gained from some type of guidance to assist the pilot




A tailless delta-wing SST of relatively high wing loading (463 kg/m2, 95 lb/ft2) at maximum
gross weight has been considered in' this study. This configuration has proved useful for pointing
out the effects of the basic aerodynamic and geometric differences between delta supersonic
and swept-wing subsonic transports; however, its characteristics will not necessarily be evident
in all delta SST aircraft. The on-ground lift capabilities and T/W of the subject airplane resulted
in takeoff speeds limited by climb considerations. Had the same airframe possessed higher T/W
or lesser on-ground lift, the takeoff speeds could have been limited by lift-off considerations,
and many of the concerns regarding climbout diminished. However, operating economics (the
need to fly the largest possible payload) indicate that the subject configuration is not unrealistic.
Certainly, such characteristics are a possibility that must be accounted for in the formulation
and development of airworthiness standards for supersonic transports. Some of the certification-
related observations follow.
1. Takeoff speeds based on FAR 25, criteria for subsonic transports, were unacceptable
because of the criticality of rotation-abuse effects on one-engine-inoperative performance. The
greater degradation of SST climb gradient with decreasing speed creates the need for a require-
ment providing protection against climb speed abuse.
2. Satisfactory takeoff speeds for the subject SST were based on proposed Anglo-French
TSS criteria, the dominating criterion being that V2 be at least 1.15 times the one-engine-
inoperative zero-rate-of-climb speed. A V^ was then selected that would allow the attainment
of Vi at the 10.7-m height following a normal rotation with one engine inoperative. Even though
these reference speeds provided a greater first-segment climb capability than for the RJT, the
speed increment between lift-off and the 10.7-m height with one engine inoperative was typically
less than for the RJT (and was frequently negative), apparently as a result of induced drag during
the flareup and a greater rate of decreasing ground effect with increasing height. This made it
necessary to have V2 nearly attained prior to lift-off with an engine inoperative.
3. It appears advisable to require that the first-segment climb gradient be realized at a
lift-off speed that results from a maximum-practical-rate rotation initiated at Vg with one
engine inoperative. Lift-off speed following a maximum practical rate rotation with one engine
inoperative was about 5 knots less than following a normal rotation and resulted in a degradation
in climb gradient greater than the present required first-segment gradient (0.5 percent).
4. For abused takeoff tests, especially with one engine inoperative, distance to the 10.7-m
height should not be the sole criterion. Because the ability to climb or accelerate is so sensitive
to speed, abuse test results should be based on a combination of distance to the 10.7-m height and
climb capability at that point. For example, this could be accomplished by requiring that the
airplane be able to exceed some minimum acceptable climb angle during the initial climbout.
5. Takeoff speeds selected to ensure adequate safety in the event of engine failure made
the airplane quite forgiving of early, rapid, and overrotation abuses with all engines operating.
6. Late, slowed, or underrotations coupled with the high acceleration cause larger over-
shoots of the normal lift-off speed and may require larger margins between lift-off speed and
critical tire limit speeds than with the subsonic transports. Lift-off distance is also greatly increased
15
by these abuses, but it does not appear to be a very important factor unless visibility conditions
or cockpit procedures hinder the pilot's ability to foresee an impending overrun. Climb capability
will be significantly greater at the higher lift-off speeds.
7. If takeoff abuse tests are to be evaluated on the basis of distance to the 10.7-m height,
it is considered necessary to specify F3S for early rotation tests because takeoff distance varies
greatly depending on F35. However F3S should not be specified for a specified attitude control
task (overrotation or underrotation) because the attitude requirement, in itself, determines the
V3S. For one-engine-inoperative speed-abuse takeoffs, it should be permissible to carry the
entire speed abuse to the 10.7-m height. For all-engines-operating abuses, it appeared reasonable
to require recovery of one-half the speed error by the 10.7-m height.
8. On several occasions during one-engine-inoperative tests, the large ground effect on
lift appeared to contribute to an inadvertent and significant increase in distance to the 10.7-m
height. On these occasions, the pilot would typically rotate to and maintain a pitch attitude of
11° to 12°, rather than the normal 14°. In the condition of full ground effect, lift-off occurred
along with a satisfactory initial rate of climb. As height increased, ground effect lift decreased,
causing a decrease in flight path angle. Angle of attack correspondingly increased since pitch
attitude was being held constant, and a checked ascent resulted. The pilot was not immediately
alerted to the reduced climb rate because of his intense concentration on attitude and airspeed
during this critical flight phase. To avoid this situation, the pilot must gradually increase attitude
during the initial departure from the ground, a technique that should be introduced in pilot
training, but with some warnings against overrotation.
9. Further research, such as observations of actual aircraft operations, is needed to define
the probability of occurrence of various takeoff abuses, and the factors influencing them. Con-
sideration of combined abuses (e.g., early rapid rotation with one engine inoperative) may be
needed because of the severity of the consequences.
10. Takeoff and climbout procedures tailored to minimize the effects of an engine failure
should be evaluated for specific SST (and other high T/W) configurations.
11. During surprise refused takeoffs, the sequence of application of deceleration devices
(throttles, brakes, spoilers) differs from that commonly assumed in the certification process of
determining the accelerate-stop distance and has the effect of increasing the stopping distance.
The effects of this difference could be greater for SST airplanes. (See appendix C.)
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, Calif. 94035, July 31, 1972
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APPENDIX A
USE OF THE MOTION SYSTEM
The FSAA described in this report and in references 3 and 4 was designed for operation with
six-degrees-of-freedom, although the pitch degree of freedom was not operable when the tests
discussed here were conducted. This appendix describes the motion drive computations used for
the simulator motion system and gives an assessment of resulting system effectiveness.
Motion Drive Computations
The motion drive computations (ref. 9) were developed during an initial simulator "shake-
down" period and consisted primarily of second-order washouts with 0.7 damping ratio for all
degrees of freedom. Break frequencies were 0.5 rad/sec for lateral, roll, and yaw accelerations, and
1.4 rad/sec for vertical and longitudinal accelerations. In addition, roll acceleration was attenuated
0.5, and a "residual tilt" was used to sustain prolonged steady-state lateral accelerations. Residual
tilt consisted of a washed-in bank angle phased with the washout of acceleration along the lateral
track. These computations resulted in a maneuvering envelope that allowed 35° banked turns and in-
cremental vertical accelerations up to 0.25 g without encountering the lateral and vertical travel limits..
A second motion configuration was sometimes used for tests where very little lateral maneuver-
ing was anticipated. This configuration was identical to the first except that roll was not attenuated
and the "residual tilt" was not used; lateral maneuvering was restricted to ±18° of airplane bank
angle, and for maneuvers within this bank angle range, the differences between the two motion
configurations were not readily apparent.
Flap, spoiler, and stall buffeting were included in the computations for the vertical drive
for enhancement of the "flight" environment.
Computations were performed by a hybrid digital-analog system, with digital operations on
the basic equations of motion and the analog operations dealing with motion washout and
computer-cockpit interface. The program was expedited by the rapid changeover time achievable
with this computer arrangement; changes from one airplane to another could be made in less
than 5 minutes.
System Effectiveness
All participating pilots were enthusiastic in their acceptance of the motion system, because
it allowed them to use a natural piloting technique and provided them with a relatively realistic
environment. They considered the forces imposed on them to be "very realistic" and to blend
well with the visual cues. They found the cues extremely effective in easing the control task
following an engine failure and for lateral maneuvering tasks (e.g., an offset correction during
landing approach).
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Pilots felt that "with motion, the takeoff rotation seemed a lot more natural" even though
there was no pitch motion. One pilot said "I don't notice the lack of the pitch motion. I think
that the combination of az that we get with the vertical drive and the visual pitch cues that
we get essentially fulfill the sensation requirements. I have a very definite sensation that we are
pitching, and if nobody had told me we didn't have pitch motion I don't think I would recognize
it."
Even though the pitch rotational motion was not operative in these tests, the pilot received
significant pitch cues through the vertical motion drives, because of the large pilot-to-center-of-
gravity lever arms for the three subject airplanes, and through the visual display. The lack of
pitch motion was not considered a limitation in this study; however, it should not be interpreted
that pitch motion is unnecessary in general. The necessity of pitch motion depends on such factors
as the task, other cue-producing capabilities of the simulator being used, and the geometry and
control characteristics of the vehicles being simulated.
Figure 31 illustrates motion system fidelity by comparing computed accelerations with
measurements taken from simulator-mounted accelerometers. Figure 31 (a) shows the lateral
and roll accelerations accompanying a Dutch roll oscillation, which indicate good motion-
system response. The high-frequency content, due primarily to structural noise, is characteristic
of that present in actual aircraft and therefore adds to the realism.
Figure 31 (b) shows lateral and vertical accelerations during a takeoff in which an outboard
engine fails. On comparison of the computed and resulting vertical acceleration traces, the good
response is apparent, as is the washout of the lower frequency content. The lateral acceleration
traces demonstrate the nearly one-to-one relationship between the computed and measured
values. The important lateral acceleration cue accompanying the engine failure is clearly shown.
Figure 32 illustrates the significance of the motion cues by comparing motion-on and
motion-off time histories of SST takeoffs with an outboard engine failure near lift-off. Without
motion, there is a 2.3-sec lag in the time required for the pilot to recognize the failure and
react with corrective rudder. He must wait to observe visually the effect of his control inputs
and has a tendency, apparent in the control traces shown, toward excessive control motions
and severe overcontrolling. The bank angle and sideslip excursions were twice as great without
motion as with motion, and the resulting penalties on performance were critical.
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APPENDIX B
SELECTION OF SST TAKEOFF REFERENCE SPEEDS
As a prerequisite to the takeoff tests, it was necessary to determine a set of takeoff reference
speeds for the SST about which speed abuses could be imposed. Three sets of reference speeds
were considered from the different available airworthiness standards: (1) Federal Aviation Regula-
lations (FAR 25) (ref. 6), the U.S. airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes;
(2) TSS standards (TSS) (ref. 7), Anglo-French airworthiness requirements for supersonic trans-
ports; and (3) Tentative Airworthiness Standards for Supersonic Transports (TASST) (ref. 8),
current thinking of U.S. authorities on SST standards at the time of this study.
The various requirements on V^ and V2 from these three sets, of standards are listed in
tables 5 and 6. The relation of all takeoff speeds and takeoff distances as established by the various
requirements is depicted in figure 33. The primary factors considered were the minimum control
speed (Vfri£), the first- and second-segment climb capability (ft and 7 2 )> maneuverability at
Vi, margin between one-engine-inoperative climb speed (F2) and the corresponding zero-rate-
of-climb speed (^7/?rO> and margin between lift-off speed (Yrnp) and minimum unstick
speed (VMU).
FAR 25 and Early TASST Requirements
Of the various criteria for defining V^ and F2 given in FAR 25 and TASST (as they existed
at the initiation of this study), the most critical was the FAR 25 requirement of a 3 percent second-
segment-climb gradient at V2. Figure 9 shows climb gradient versus speed for the SST and, for
comparison, that for the RJT. Note that to provide 3 percent second-segment climb, V2 for the
SST must be at least 211 knots. Piloted simulator runs then determined that a rotation speed
Vj£ of 193 knots allowed attainment of V2 by the 10.7-m height with one engine inoperative.
This value for F^ also satisfied the requirements related to Vj^jj and VM£, in contrast to
experience with subsonic swept-wing jet transports, where the V^y requirement usually defined
the value of V^.
It was immediately obvious that because of the rapid decrease in climb gradient available with
decrease in speed for the SST (fig. 9), these reference speeds did not provide sufficient margin
for rotation abuses with one engine inoperative. Simulator experience with these reference
speeds led to the observation that characteristics of delta-wing aircraft can create a false sense
of security. The high T/W and low drag in the taxi attitude resulted in impressive takeoff accel-
eration and all-engines-operating climb performance. With an engine inoperative, ground accel-
eration remained impressive until rotation when performance was seriously degraded as a result
of the high induced drag. If the takeoff reference speeds selected were too low, the large ground
effect lift made it possible to lift off before sufficient speed was acquired to enable safe climbout,
acceleration, or maneuvering with an engine inoperative. In addition, if speed became too low,
there were no configuration changes (after gear retraction) or thrust augmentation on which the
pilot could rely for recovery by improving the effective L/D. Figure 9 shows that at speeds less
than 195 knots and with an engine inoperative, the airplane was unable to climb and could not
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accelerate to a better L/D condition without sacrificing altitude. On several occasions, pilots found
themselves "trapped" in ground effect as a result of an early rotation accompanied by engine failure.
TASST revisions, which would specify higher values for F^ and F2 and thereby provide more
protection in the event of climb-speed abuse with one engine inoperative, appear necessary to
provide a level of safety for SST takeoff equivalent to that provided for the existing subsonic
jet transports. Possible revisions are discussed below.
Anglo-French TSS and Revised TASST Requirements
The Anglo-French TSS provides protection against climb-speed abuse by requiring that
Vi be at least 1.15 times the one-engine-inoperative zero-rate-of-climb speed ^ZRC'^n Edition,
climb gradient requirements are specified in terms of the induced-drag-to-weight ratio (Kl D/W).
The first of these requirements was the critical one for the subject SST, although both define
higher takeoff speeds than do the FAR 25 and TASST requirements. In figure 9, it can be seen
that F£/?C *s 195.5 knots; therefore, F2 must be at least 225 knots. Based on one-engine-
inoperative simulator runs, a rotation speed of 209 knots was found to be compatible with the
225-knot F2.
Proposed revisions to the TASST were submitted by the FAA while this study was in
progress. These included the added requirement that V^ be "a speed at which a measurably
positive rate of climb exists out of ground effect in the gear-down takeoff configuration with
the critical engine inoperative." For the subject SST in this configuration, the zero-rate-of-
climb speed was about 205 knots; thus, this criterion was satisfied by the use of the 209-knot V^.
Pilots felt that the 209-knot V^ provided an adequate safety margin in the event of engine
failure, and that 205 knots represented a minimum satisfactory speed. One pilot felt that 209 knots
was insufficient from the ground clearance consideration. The high takeoff speeds and low static
longitudinal stability resulted in an elevator deflection for rotation about one-half that for the
RJT. Thus, until pilots became accustomed to the excess control power, it was easy to rotate
the SST abruptly and inadvertently strike the tail, especially with the reduced acceleration
associated with a failed engine.
For the majority of the subsequent SST takeoff tests, the basic target value of F^ was




The certification of an airplane under FAR 25 (ref. 6) includes measurements of the accelerate-
stop distance to determine the pilot's decision speed Vl and to provide one of the factors used
to establish the takeoff field length requirements. Reference 10 is a review of the criteria used to
obtain this distance and indicates several areas where additional test data would help to resolve
differences between the interpretation of the regulations as applied to flight test measurements
and operational procedures. The large number of takeoffs to be performed during the general
test program of this report presented a unique opportunity to investigate pilot responses to
surprise engine failures occurring before the Vl speed that result in refused takeoffs (RTO).
The realism of the simulator cockpit, visual scene, and 1:1 lateral motion available during the
takeoff allowed real world cues to alert the pilot to the loss of an engine; consequently, his
responses are very like an operational situation.
Applicable Criteria
The takeoff field length requirements for large civil jet transport aircraft is the greater of:
(1) the field length determined by balancing the accelerate-stop distance with the takeoff distance
to a height of 10.7 m at V2 speed, assuming the critical engine to fail at Vl speed in both cases;
and (2) 115 percent of the horizontal distance required to take off and climb to 10.7 m at F2 speed
with all engines operating. In most cases, (2) is the determining factor; however, the decision
speed Vi is based on accelerate-stop criteria that are heavily influenced by individual aircraft and
control configurations. Engine failures prior to Vl were therefore introduced at unannounced
times during the test program to induce takeoff refusals so that criteria for the simulated SST
could be developed and compared with that used for the reference jet during its certification.
FAR 25.109 (ref. 6) defines the accelerate-stop distance as the sum of the distances necessary
to: (1) accelerate the airplane from a standing start to Vi; and (2) come to a full stop from the
point at which V± is reached, assuming that the critical engine fails at Vi.
The greatest flexibility in the interpretation of this regulation is in the determination of the
distance traveled from the point of engine failure to the attainment of the full deceleration
configuration. The certification procedure provides for a pilot reaction time after engine failure
to the point of brake application, followed by the allotted times for retardation of throttles
and application of -spoilers -and other approved deceleration controls. One second is added to the
measured times for each additional control action after brake application. Figure 34 illustrates
the conventional method of determining the transition time. The distance traveled during the
transition time depends to a large degree on the sequence of control actions and the speed
gained after engine failure recognition. During certification tests to measure the transition time
intervals, the pilot applies brakes immediately; however, as discussed in reference 10, several
factors suggest that brake application will not be the pilot's first action in an actual refused takeoff.
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Simulation Test Procedure
The timing and sequencing of the pilot's actions following engine failure were recorded from
20 surprise RTO's involving four pilots and the three airplanes (SST, RJT, and JJT). The pilots
were briefed to expect engine failures before Vl; however, the ratio of about one RTO for each
25 takeoffs maintained a significant surprise factor. The only technique briefed was that the pilot
keep his hand on the throttles until F, speed, which was called out by the copilot. In all cases,
rudder-pedal nose-wheel steering was provided on a simulated dry runway, and the task included
maintaining directional control during the deceleration.
The cockpit side force and heading deviations noted on the visual display were representative
of an abrupt failure of an outboard engine on airplanes of the types tested.
Observations
The test data for the 20 events are presented in 1 table 7. Most of the engine failures occurred
at about 15 knots below F, speed, which may have reduced the sense of urgency. However, the
pilots were briefed to provide as quick a stop as feasible.
The timing of the pilots' control actions is shown in figure 35. The control sequence used
was basically the same for all three aircraft and four pilots. In all cases, the throttles were retarded
first. In four cases, the spoilers were deployed before wheel brakes. Average times from engine
failure were 1.6, 3.9,. and 5.5 sec for throttle chop, brake application, and spoiler actuation,
respectively. The airspeed overshoot after engine failure is shown in figure 36. The RJT and JJT
had essentially identical characteristics, so their data are combined. Because of the higher thrust-
weight ratio and lower drag in the taxi attitude, SST acceleration was greater than for the RJT
and JJT, and larger speed overshoots resulted. ^
The consistency of the pilots' control sequence in the simulated operational refused takeoff
indicated. a well-developed behavior pattern formed through training and experience in normal
stops that reinforce this sequence. In addition, the pilots were primarily concerned with maintain-
ing directional control during the ground run. The decision to stop was followed by retardation
of throttles and application of rudder to correct the track down the runway. Simultaneous rudder
input for yaw control and brake application did not occur. Once the throttles were retarded, the
pilot's hand was free to apply spoilers. The fact that the pilots delayed braking until yaw control
was applied introduced a significant delay in attaining the full deceleration configuration.
The control sequence generally applied during certification accelerate-stop distance demon-
strations compares with the sequence observed in the simulated operational refused takeoffs
as follows:
Certification demonstration Simulated operational RTO
1. wheel brakes 1. throttle cut and rudder applied
2. throttle cut 2. wheel brakes
3. spoilers 3. spoilers
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The differences in brake application time of the two sequences would result in significant
increases in stopping distance. This effect could be greater for SST aircraft.
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TABLE 1.- PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATOR









±12.2 m (+40 ft)
±1.22 m (±4.0 ft)





3.66 m/sec2 (12 ft/sec2)
3.66m/sec2 (12 ft/sec2)











TABLE 2.- COMPARISON OF SIGNIFICANT PARAMETERS AT V2 FOR
THE THREE SIMULATED AIRPLANES
Gross weight, kg (Ib)
Maximum T/W
Wing loading, kg/m2 (lb/ft2)
Roll inertia, kg-m2 (slug-ft2 )
Pitch inertia, kg-m2 (slug-ft2)
Yaw inertia, kg-m2 (slug-ft2)
Pilot-to-CG distance, m(ft)
Maximum ground attitude, deg
_qScdC m
Ma
~ lyy 3a '1/S£C






















































0.195 to 0.32 c
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TABLE 3.- CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE THREE AIRPLANES
Control column
Force gradient, N/cm (Ib/in.)
Breakout force, N (Ib)
Travel, aft/fwd., cm (in.)
Control wheel
Force gradient, N/deg (Ib/deg)
Breakout force, N (Ib)
Travel, deg
Rudder pedal
Force gradient, N/cm (Ib/in.)
Breakout force, N (Ib)
Travel, cm (in.)





Elevator trim, T.E. up/T.E. do\yn, deg
Horizontal stabilizer, ANU/AND, deg
Nose-gear steering, deg
Stability augmentation system
Pitch damper authority, deg
Pitch damper gain, 8e/q, sec
Roll damper authority, deg









































































































 Lateral spoilers are deflected in proportion to the wheel deflection exceeding ±41° when the landing gear is extended.
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R Reference Jet Transport




Figure 1.- Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft (FSAA) motion system.
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Figure 2.- Pilot's station in the FSAA.
(a) FD-109 attitude indicator.
(b) Airspeed indicator.
Figure 3.- Attitude and airspeed instruments used in1 the study.
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(a) Left outboard engine failure during rotation.
Figure 10.- Time histories of one-engine-inoperative crosswind takeoffs; 25-knot
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Figure 11 — Average normal takeoff time histories and envelopes of extremes.
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Figure 12.— Histogram comparison of rotation speed errors; maximum
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Figure 13.— Histogram comparison of time elapsed between rotation initiation and
lift-off. All engines operating, maximum takeoff gross weight.
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Rotation time, t r~sec
Figure 14.— Minimum tail clearance vs rotation time. All engines
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Figure 18.- Histogram comparison of measured distance to lift-off and distance to






















































































































Figure 21.- Comparison of the incremental vertical acceleration at the C.G. and at the
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Figure 22.- Speed vs distance during maximum-weight takeoffs.
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Figure 24.- Time history of a one-engine-inoperative SST takeoff, with rotation at the
















 g1 10 :::::!!::!::;:!!::iilili:;:;j
CL oUllllllllllllllllllllllll.l








400 10.7 m(35ft) height
j = 2950m(9676ft)
200"
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time, sec
Figure 25 .— Time history of one-engine-inoperative SST takeoff with
rotation 5 knots early; V '- 204.8 knots, V = 175 knots.
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Figure 26.- Time histories of one-engine-inoperative 10-knots-early
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Figure 27.— Time histories of one-engine-inoperative SST takeoffs with Vg = 200 knots;
— 1 ^ 5 knots. Note: Dampers off, column gradient reduced to 6 Ib/in.
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Figure 28.- Time histories of one-engine-inoperative SST takeoffs with
rotation at the maximum practical rate; VEF ** 175 knots.





 I0 l i i i i i i : ; ; ; ! ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ! ; ; ; ; ! ; ; ; !
•5-8 U ::::::::: : ; : ; : ; : : :||
.
 400 ml0.7m (35ft) h<
<1) t T" ' r*
~o f i :S3K = 2900m(
5£ 200 fg|inni||||||'|ini]fjp
< ::::::::: ::::::::: : : : : : : : :::
ortTtiHiiiii i i i i i iniiiniiHiiiii
250MlllllllllllllillllHllllfflffff
200 =|i|=iii i i i i l i i
"g
 w 150 !!!i i i i ! i l i i | i i j !!;;! i i ! i; i i ;
>-* 100 ii|;i ii: i ;;:;;;;
50 :;::i!!::tM |:;::::;:::
[|lll|llll|iii|lil[lili^
:i:i:J ii i i i i i i i i i i i i i i ; iiiiiiihiiiiii ii! iiili
Tail s
;ight m|||||ii|||||||[||| |||||||||||||j|||iiJd 10.7m
9510ft):;;::;::: : ;;;: ;;;::;|;;;;:;;;; S35=4
:;l:;;;;;;;;; iii-j:1;:: :;;;: ;;:;;;;;; j:;;=i : ; : ; ; ; : : : ; ;
i I I! ! i;;; ; ;;;;; ;;; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
^ V35=2I8.9 1 1 iiili
:;;;: ::l
 : ; ; ; ;;;;;i;; ;;;; :;;; ;;, ! : ; ; ; : (b) ;; :::: •••••-••• ;:;
iiiiiiiiiiliiliiijl '0
 c£
|°.i I!!!!!! liillliii0 ^-
trike
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiliiii ii;
; ; ; ; : ; |;;;:;:|:::;;;:[;;:;;;;
(35ft) height mm 120 £
770m(l5634ft) :
 8Q „-
; : ; : : : : \ \ - : : ! ! : ; ; : : ; : ; :
; V35=220.9 : : : : : : : : ;
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time, sec
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time, sec
(a) Proper climb attitude;
*
205A knots
(b) Attempt to accelerate to F2 before
reaching the 10.7-m (35 ft) height;
VRACH = 202'° knots'
Figure 29.- Time histories of one-engine-inoperative SST abuse takeoffs with rotation
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Figure 30.— Effect of rotation speed abuse, A Vn, on measured takeoff distance
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(a) Comparison of computed and measured accelerations during
a Dutch roll oscillation.
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(b) Accelerations at the pilot's station during a one-engine-inoperative
takeoff with the RJT.
Figure 31.— Concluded.
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Figure 32.— Effect of motion on controllability of an SST takeoff with





































0 I 2 3
Time from engine failure, sec
Figure 34.— Accelerate-stop pilot action times. Example of method used in






























Figure 35.— Timing of pilots' control actions during simulated refused takeoffs.
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AV, knots
Figure 36.— Speed overshoots after engine failure from simulated refused takeoffs.
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